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Abstract
Background: Over the past 20 years, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have raised enormous expectations,
passionate political controversies and an ongoing debate on how these technologies should be assessed. Current
risk assessment procedures generally assess GMOs in terms of their potential risk of negatively affecting human
health and the environment. Can this risk-benefit approach deliver a robust assessment of GMOs? In this paper, we
question the validity of current risk assessment from both a social and an ecological perspective, and we elaborate
an alternative approach, namely in-context trajectory evaluation. This paper combines frame analysis, context
analysis and ecosocial analysis to three different case studies.
Results: Applying frame analysis to Syngenta’s recent campaign ‘Bring plant potential to life’, we first de-construct
the technosocial imaginaries driving GMOs innovation, showing how the latter endorses the technological fix of
socioeconomic problems whilst reinforcing the neoliberal sociopolitical paradigm. Applying context analysis to
biopharming in New Zealand, we then explore local practices and knowledge, showing that particularities of
context typically omitted from risk assessment processes play a key role in determining both the risks and the
potential benefits of a technology. Finally, drawing from the Italian case, we outline through ecosocial analysis how
the lack of long-term studies, further aggravated by current methodological deficiencies, prevent risk assessment
from considering not only how GMOs affect the environmental context but also, and most importantly, the way
people live in, and interact with, this context.
Conclusion: Incorporating frame analysis, context analysis and ecosocial analysis, in the form of in-context
trajectory evaluation, into the assessment of GMOs can improve the social compatibility, political accountability and
ecological sustainability of its outcomes.
Introduction
Over the past 30 years, modern biotechnologies have
raised enormous expectations as well as passionate poli-
tical controversies, leading to a strong polarization in
European societies, to permanent tensions with the USA
about commercialization under World Trade Organiza-
tion agreements and to an ongoing debate over risk
assessment and risk management procedures. Main-
stream risk assessment approaches conventionally
understand risk assessment as ‘a factually grounded,
objective and value free analytic exercise’ [1]. Consistent
with this understanding, new technologies are typically
assessed in terms of their potential risk of negatively
affecting human health and in terms of their environ-
mental risks [2].
Risk assessment procedures, however, have not driven
out all concerns about genetically modified organisms
(GMOs), whilst doubts have been raised about the enor-
mous pressures exerted by multinational corporations
active in the fields of GMOs as well as about the con-
flicts of interest that may potentially affect the scientific
experts working for regulating authorities like the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The indepen-
dence and reliability of risk assessment procedures have
been contested not only because they have often been
carried out by the same multinational corporations pro-
ducing the GMOs under evaluation but also because the
original data, for commercial reasons, have not been
released to the academic community [3].
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Moreover, recent advances in genetics have high-
lighted the fact that the genome is a complex system,
which, far from being a mechanistic sequence of genes
independent of each other, can be considered as an eco-
system where all genes interact on a permanent basis
[4]. This appreciation of the complexity of the genome
has raised important questions about long-term and
unpredictable consequences of genetic engineering [5],
but the EFSA has not yet fully acknowledged this com-
plexity and the attendant uncertainty.a In addition, a
number of independent studies on GMOs have recently
questioned official assurances of safety on a number of
specific points [6-11].
The universality, objectivity and neutrality of risk
assessment methods have also been questioned, particu-
larly in contexts of low scientific certainty, high stakes
[12] and low social and political consensus [13]. Despite
the fact that ‘scientific representations of risk are routi-
nely predicated on assumptions...which are not them-
selves scientific’ and that ‘scientific’ risk assessments are
‘inevitably hybrid judgements, dependent on both scien-
tific and normative considerations’ [14] EFSA continues
to strictly characterise risk assessment as ‘a scientific
exercise’ [15]. If ‘science and values interact dynamically
in the process of risk analysis, even at early stages when
risks are first being assessed’ [13], then scientific uncer-
tainty requires judgement calls to be made, which will
inevitably reflect the values of those making the calls.
These judgement calls are typically embodied in criteria
for acceptable technical data and methods. As pointed
out by a United Nation Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) expert on food safety, such criteria are
imbued with values at a number of junctures; for exam-
ple, risk characterisation may involve value-laden
choices of parameters (e.g. between mortality or mor-
bidity, between ‘best practice’ or ‘typical use’) and
choices of extrapolation models (e.g. when moving from
animal to human toxicity studies or when shifting from
micro-ecosystems to farm-scale agricultural environ-
ments) [13]. Finally, risk assessment procedures also
incorporate assumptions, obviously value-laden, on the
significance given to the distribution of risks, on what
constitutes a benefit worth taking a risk for and what
level of risk is acceptable.
Not only can risk assessment not be value-free but it
also cannot be divorced from consideration of the con-
text(s) - both biophysical and sociopolitical - in which
the technology is to be implemented. That is, assessing
risk - identifying and estimating the nature, magnitude
and likelihood of potential harms - must include consid-
eration of social context, including the attitudes and
practices of those (individuals and institutions) involved
in managing risk. Localised neglect or flouting of risk
management protocols, weak enforcement or monitoring
procedures, ineffective norms, lack of transparency or
reluctant authorities - all are relevant to risk assessment.
In effect, risk assessment and risk management cannot be
really separated. This is why it has been argued that risk
assessment procedures cannot operate on the basis of
technical expertise only: Lay expertise, users’ expertise
and social science expertise need to be taken into
account [16,17,5,18].
Finally, and crucially, risk assessment and risk man-
agement procedures typically operate only when the
technology has already been developed and is ready for
experimental and commercial authorization. Yet, at this
stage the technology has already had an impact on
society: Public and private resources have been invested;
universities, companies and start-ups have been
involved; promises have been made and social and poli-
tical associations and movements have been mobilized
[19]. All of these processes, which led to the actual tech-
nology being developed, have changed the innovation
regime, the research agenda priorities, the actual alloca-
tion of public resources and even the perception of the
problem for which this technology was first developed.
Social and political values, therefore, are not only
embedded in risk assessment procedures but they are
also embedded in the very technology that risk assess-
ment procedures try to evaluate.
Frame analysis: GMOs are the solution, but what was the
problem?
Narrowing down the debate to whether GMOs consti-
tute a threat to human health and the environment, risk
assessment approaches have reduced the evaluation of
GMOs merely to a question of how much risk a society
can bear in exchange for the potential benefits claimed
for the technology. Yet, there is much more to the
implications of GMOs than the risk/benefit relationship
suggests. This will be illustrated here by an examination
of the current public relations campaign by Syngenta, in
particular, of the way Syngenta frames the issue of
GMOs.
Frames, in the social sciences, are ‘principles of selec-
tion, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit
theories about what exists, what happens, and what mat-
ters’ [20]. Framing is active at all times and is a function
of our desire to control and master events that look
complex at first sight. Frames help the analysts to order
their experiences of reality into patterns of causes and
effects so that a given problem can be understood and
addressed. As a consequence, frame analysis should con-
stitute a fundamental tool of policy studies and policy
making because a better understanding of the frames
used to make sense of a given problem is essential to
evaluate the solution suggested to solve that problem
[20]. It can, for example, help to identify when the
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proposed solution is an inappropriate ‘technological fix’,
through which problems that have social, economic or
political causes are framed and addressed in terms of a
technological ‘solution’. Such a solution claims to
address unwanted effects but leaves untouched their
non-technical origins.
Recently, Syngenta has implemented a campaign to
promote societal support of GMOs in Europe. Syngen-
ta’s posters can be found in various buildings across
Europe, mainly airports and public places. There are
three posters related respectively to water scarcity,
world hunger and child labour. The first poster (Figure 1)
identifies the problem at stake as a growing scarcity of
(fresh? unpolluted?) water and frames that problem as a
function of water consumption by crops.
If this is the nature of the problem, then, it seems, we
must choose between ‘grow[ing] less food’ and ‘grow
[ing] food that needs less water’, and technological solu-
tions to engineer plant varieties consuming less water
not only make sense but appear as necessary and urgent:
’Providing enough food, feed, fiber and fuel for the
world’s population now and confronting future demands
depend on whether currently available agricultural tech-
nology can be fully accessed by the world’s farmers’
(Syngenta website).
Framing water scarcity as a technical issue paves the
way to a technological solution.b This obscures not only
the whole array of social, economic and political factors
that have resulted in the overuse of water and in the
pollution of water that makes it unfit for use but also
obscures the contribution to the problem of the very
innovation regime of which Syngenta’s strategy is a part.
This regime, aimed primarily at industrialised agricul-
ture in rich countries and deriving profits through intel-
lectual property in those markets, has focused on the
production of plant varieties that, in order to increase
yield, require increased inputs in the form not only of
pesticides but also irrigation. In many places, such vari-
eties and methods have displaced low-input varieties
and methods developed locally ([21]. The technological
frame allows Syngenta to claim that consideration of
such social, economic and political factors, and what
they are likely to mean for any technology developed
under this regime, is the problem: ‘In effect, the rejec-
tion of sound science in assessing technology is denying
food and income to those who would most benefit from
new technologies’ (Syngenta website).
In this way, Syngenta illustrates how framing social,
economic and political problems as a technical question
can result in the delegation of essentially political deci-
sions to expert committees, which effectively divert
responsibility from political actors to technoscientific
networks by denying the normative dimensions of con-
troversial issues [20]. A quote from Syngenta’s website
well illustrates this point:
’What is needed?
• Government officials must de-politicize their deci-
sions on the use of technology in agriculture.
• Not only do we need governments to advance
technology in developing markets, we also need gov-
ernments to support the deployment of existing
technologies across land currently under cultivation
in order to raise yields and improve farming
knowledge.’
As Syngenta’s campaign demonstrates, ‘objective’ risk
assessment approaches are often used to promote a
technocratic approach to science and technology policy,
which has been criticized on a number of political and
sociological grounds [21-27]. For instance, such
approaches neglect GMOs’ impact on existing eco-
nomic, political and social arrangements and on the
developmental trajectory of the areas selected for
Figure 1 Water scarcity (source: http://www.singenta.com, ‘Bring plant potential to life’ campaign).
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implementation [27]. As Sheila Jasanoff [28] puts it,
technology shapes society and it is shaped by it in a
mutually constitutive process of co-production where
science, technology and social order emerge side by side.
The development of GMOs well illustrates this phe-
nomenon: Syngenta’s GM crops are a product of a
sociopolitical context in which genetic traits can be
patented. Without the reinterpretation of patenting cri-
teria that occurred in the 1980sc, which extended
patentability rights to plants and animals with modified
genetic traits [29] the technique of genetic engineering
may well have been developed as part of a larger basic
research plan in molecular biology, but Syngenta’s (and
others’) commercial GM crop plants would have never
been developed. These GMOs could only have emerged
a world in which western governments invest heavily in
basic and applied research on biotechnologies in the
attempt to build a ‘knowledge-dense’ bio-economy [30]
that will maintain their competitiveness in relation to
emerging economies like China, India and Brazil. GMOs
appear meaningful only in a policy context where envir-
onmental and social problems are framed as technical
so that technological (profitable) solutions can be elabo-
rated, leaving unquestioned the actual causes of the pro-
blems at stake. This approach, which characterised the
initial policy response to GMOs, can be detected even
in more recent and reflexive assessment frameworks.
For instance, the recently proposed problem formulation
and options assessment method, which aims to provide
a ‘framework for identifying the crucial societal needs
that could be satisfied by introducing a GM crop’ [31],
certainly helps to structure and facilitates the risk
assessment by understanding and describing the receiv-
ing environments socioeconomically and ecologically
[32]. Yet, its actual framing keeps endorsing a policy
response where environmental and social problems are
framed as technical so that technological (profitable)
solutions like GMOs can be developed, leaving unques-
tioned the actual causes and factors that created those
problems in the first place.
The point is that current approaches focusing on risk do
not call into question the visions and imaginaries that sus-
tain a given technology’s trajectory [33,24]. Technological
products are not neutral objects: They have been produced
by specific actors, in specific contexts, in order to address
a specific problem, which has been framed in such a way
that given technologies make sense as solutions. As a
result of the very process triggering their emergence, tech-
nologies are loaded with social and political values; they
materialise certain paradigms; in fact, they ‘re-construct’
social paradigms (ideas and assumptions about function-
ing) into physical matter. This will remain completely
undetected as long as the focus of technology assessment
concentrates on their risk implications.
A thorough analysis of the ethical, social and political
values and principles that each technology carries
through the visions and imaginaries it promotes, thus, is
a fundamental step towards the inclusion into risk
assessment processes of what has been defined by Helga
Nowotny [23] as more socially robust knowledge.d If
social and political values are implicitly and explicitly
embedded in a given technology’s trajectory, risk assess-
ment and risk management procedures need to incorpo-
rate those who can identify these embedded values and
their implications, making them available for public and
transparent discussion and deliberation. In contrast, risk
assessment procedures take technologies for granted,
non-technical expertise is not considered relevant and
sociopolitical analyses about technology implementation
are addressed as a problem per se. Syngenta argues:
‘Regulation that is anything other than science-based
will stifle innovation and limit the ability of farmers to
grow more food with limited natural resources. Political
pre-occupations are causing a crisis of governance in
both the developed and the developing world.’
Rather than considering public concerns about GMOs
as an opportunity to reconsider the technology from a
different perspective, producing a wider and more
robust assessment of GMOs’ implications, promoters of
GMOs in industry and government continue to position
the public as the problem, calling for solutions that aim
at reducing this opposition rather than at learning from
it [34]. The concerns raised remain largely unaddressed,
when not bluntly ignored [35], despite the proliferation
of public engagement exercises, which seemingly expect
public support for GM crops to grow simply as a result
of increased dialogue and public participation [36].
Such approaches to public engagement have been
challenged on a number of theoretical and empirical
points, which relate, for instance, to who is ‘the public’
and how has it been constituted; who decides what is
going to be talked about and on what grounds and at
what stage of policy making is participation set and why
[37,38,35,24,39,27]. In other words, ‘the purpose is to
hold science and industry answerable, with the utmost
seriousness, to the fundamental questions of democratic
politics [...] Who is making the choices that govern
lives? On whose behalf? According to whose definitions
of the good? With what rights of representation? And in
which forums?’ [40].
Despite these criticisms, risk assessment and public
engagement exercises continue to treat the judgements
of experts as ‘scientific’ and public contributions to the
debate as ‘perceptions’, whilst the debate itself is highly
restricted ‘Risks are endlessly debated, whilst deeper
questions about the values, visions and vested interests
that motivate scientific endeavour often remain unasked
or unanswered’ [36]. Meanwhile, current regimes of
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science and technology innovation and ‘the driving pur-
poses and expectations shaping innovation and knowl-
edge’ [35]. are not subject to public debate and
deliberation. On the one hand, questioning public ‘per-
ceptions’ remains a dominant concern of public engage-
ment exercises, which maintain their original purpose of
reducing conflict and securing support for scientific
innovation and expert-based policy making. On the
other hand, questions about the reasons and the ways in
which certain issues, and not others, have become
objects of public policy, how and as a result of whose
action has this happened and what kind of society are
we trying to achieve through current innovation priori-
ties are prevented from emerging as key issues in tech-
nology assessment procedures.
Technology assessment in context
Perhaps easier for technocratic risk assessors to under-
stand, but still neglected within risk assessment processes,
is the significance of the context of implementation for
evaluating the risks and claimed benefits of a technology.
Technologies never operate outside a biophysical and
social context, and it is their interaction with their con-
texts that generates effects, impacts and implications. This
is a statement of the obvious, yet its ramifications have yet
to be fully recognised in risk assessment and other formal
evaluations of technology. Put simply, in order to identify
and evaluate the potential harms and benefits of a technol-
ogy, we must know how it is likely to interact with its con-
text, which requires knowledge of specific contexts as
much as it requires knowledge of the technology itself.
Knowledge of specific contexts is unlikely to come
from ‘risk experts’ or those with detailed knowledge of
the technology derived from laboratory investigations
and modelling. The kind of detailed knowledge of con-
text necessary is often more experiential than forma-
lised. People who are unfamiliar with the technology in
question may nonetheless have knowledge of context
that is highly relevant to assessing that technology. Such
people are typically not involved in formal risk assess-
ment processes.
There is ample evidence of the importance of contex-
tual knowledge to evaluating risks. In Wynne’s post-
Chernobyl study of the interactions between Cumbrian
sheep farmers and technoscientific personnel operating
as risk managers, he found that the value placed by
scientists on universally applicable models blinded them
to the importance of local context. They ignored ‘farm-
ers’ own knowledge of their local environments, hill-
sheep characteristics, and hill-farming management rea-
lities’ [16]. This specialist hill-farming expertise, which
was ‘not codified anywhere’ and was ‘passed down orally
and by apprenticeship’ [16] in fact proved essential to
predicting the behaviour of radioactive elements in the
soil and to formulating competent strategies to manage
the problem. Irwin’s [17] discussion of the risk assess-
ment of the organophosphate pesticide 2,4,5-T again
highlights ‘expert’ blindness to local or experiential
knowledge. In this case, the UK Advisory Committee on
Pesticides (ACP) concluded that the pesticide was safe,
provided it was used ‘in the recommended way.’ Farm
workers, with knowledge of actual farm practices as well
as of the social (power) relations involved, argued that it
could not be judged safe because the prescribed precau-
tions could not be taken in the actually existing contexts
of use: ‘the conditions envisaged by members of the
[ACP] ... are impossible to reproduce in the field’ [17].
There is also evidence of the importance of contextual
factors to the realisation of claimed benefits. Outcomes
of attempts to evaluate the performance and economic
impact of GM crops in developing countries have been
highly inconsistent. This, as Glover has shown in his
survey of evaluations of ‘pro-poor’ effects of Bt cotton,
is a result of abstraction from context:
’The efforts of analysts have been largely confounded...
not only by the sheer complexity of the factors involved,
but because the external variables they have struggled to
control and exclude are actually essential to understand-
ing the impacts of new crop varieties on farms. In other
words, the strenuous efforts to rule out the effects of
‘externalities’ can be seen as a reflection of a basic fail-
ure to recognise the fundamental importance of contex-
tual factors in complex socio-technical systems.’ [41]
The relevant contexts include both biophysical factors
(e.g. the local suitability of the background germplasm,
seasonal rainfall, irrigation, soils, pest attacks and dis-
eases) and sociopolitical factors:
‘[S]eed choices, pest-management strategies, cropping
patterns and farming systems are embedded in a parti-
cular household’s or farmer’s wider livelihood strategy,
which in turn is embedded in a set of social and institu-
tional relationships and processes.’ [41]
The value of attending to specificities of context is
illustrated here with examples from research exploring
risks and potential benefits from implementing bio-
pharming in New Zealand [42-44] Biopharming involves
the production of plants and animals that have been
genetically engineered to produce pharmaceutical sub-
stances (in, e.g. their leaves, seeds or milk) and the
extraction and purification of those substances for use
in humans. It is promoted as a lower-cost and more
flexibly scalable production process. It is still unclear
whether biopharming will be successful in these terms.
Those who see biopharming as beneficial for New Zealand
have portrayed it as a great opportunity for New Zealand
farmers to add value to their products. The success of
this strategy depends not only on the commercial suc-
cess of biopharming as a drug production process but
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also on the practicalities of New Zealand farmers taking
up biopharming.
Unlike other forms of drug production, biopharming
poses the risk of contamination of the food supply, espe-
cially if the drug is made in a food-producing platform
(such as food crop plants or cow, sheep or goat milk).
The prevention of contamination requires strict contain-
ment. Farmers and others with practical experience of
managing plants and animals and their products are an
excellent source of knowledge relevant to whether or
not strict containment on a ‘biopharm’ is feasible.
Indeed, as suggested by Mauro et al. [45,46], farmer
knowledge would appear to be a valuable source of
information for the evaluation of agricultural technolo-
gies, including GM technologies, in general, yet it
remains neglected by policy makers and researchers,
especially in the global north. The farmers and others
associated with the types of farming most likely to ‘host’
biopharming in New Zealand, that is, dairying and seed
farming, identified a range of risk factors related to spe-
cificities of context. For example, the experience of
those in seed farming suggested that complete contain-
ment in open-field conditions is impossible due to the
impacts of wind, insects, birds and other animals. Most
specialist seed farming in New Zealand is carried out in
Canterbury, famous for its northwesterly winds, posing
threats of cross-pollination. Although systems have been
devised to minimise such contamination, local knowl-
edge indicated that such systems are not adequate for
the prevention of all contaminatione:
‘[I]n the Canterbury Plains, I don’t know how you ever
restrict that.... It’s probably likely that the outcross is
going to be not just 10 yards down the road, but prob-
ably 10 k or 15 k down the road. So 3 k or 5 k isola-
tion’s probably a waste of time.’
Long experience of particular crops produced observa-
tions that call into question the adequacy of proposed
management regimes. For example, whilst the problem
of persistence of viable seed in the soil is recognised, the
experience of seed farmers suggests that it may be more
intractable than typically acknowledged. Brassicas, as
well as other oilseed crops, ryegrass and clover, were
singled out as posing particular difficulties.
‘If you have an oilseed crop, a Brassica crop, so a seed
that has oil in it, [in] two years time it will be: oh, this
crop is coming up again. And 20 years later perhaps: it’s
coming up again. And we’re seeing that.’
‘Clover’s a bad news one because it can stay in
20 years. Rye grass, probably 10 years. Brassicas - forever,
from my observation.’
It is often assumed that the risks posed by contexts
can be mitigated by procedural requirements or controls
imposed on the use of the technology. Observations
such as those made above, however, suggest that
technology assessments must take seriously the possibi-
lity that the context cannot be made safe enough.f
Moreover, the New Zealand research also questions the
advisability of assuming that mandated controls will be
consistently implemented. This, too, will be a function of
context, both social and biophysical. Biopharming for
farmers would be an economic activity like any other.
This creates a situation in which there may be economic
incentives to flout containment requirements. Farmers
noted that rules are most often ignored when there is an
economic incentive not to follow them. As with any pro-
duct, increased market supply or reduced market
demand may erode the profitability of the operation,
whilst the existence of potentially competing production
platformsg [47-49] could bring about sudden increases
in supply (and reductions in price). Biopharm animals
may become ill, rendering them an economic liability.
Costs to farmers may increase unexpectedly and render
the contract less profitable. Such pressures experienced
by a farmer directly or through his/her employer could
provide an incentive not to follow the rules.
A relevant example supplied by dairy farmers of non-
adherence to risk management rules involves herds con-
taining tuberculosis-infected cows. Infected animals
must be made readily identifiable, and there are restric-
tions on their movement. However, some farmers flout
these rules, moving the infected herds without permis-
sion. Those involved in seed production noted that it is
difficult to ensure that a combine harvester is comple-
tely clear of previously harvested plant material. Eco-
nomic pressures might result in not cleaning harvesters
as well as they perhaps should:
‘Are you going to spend another three hours [cleaning
the combine] in the sunshine, [when] you could be
combining and the rain’s forecast for the next day?
Probably not ... I can give you the PC [politically cor-
rect] answer, ‘no, no, we signed the documents and we’ll
do that.’ I think in practical terms corners get cut.’
Such incentives are intertwined with ownership and
management arrangements and with farmers’ own assess-
ments of and attitudes towards risks. Farmers’ and other
operators’ own beliefs regarding the riskiness of an
operation affect the likelihood that they will meticulously
follow risk management protocols. That is, if a protocol
is felt to be arbitrary or out of proportion to the risk as
the farmer understands it, it may not be followed. This
implies that the effectiveness of controls is to a significant
degree reliant on farmer discretion. One example of this
given by dairy farmers pertains to effluent disposal: They
think ‘oh, this will do’, you know, ‘the rules are that strict,
but if we do this and this, it might be all right’.
In the seed sector, the demands of production and
farmers’ confidence in their own abilities may shape atti-
tudes towards following rules:
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’Farmers tend - they’re practical people cracking on
with the job. So they’re not looking at their ISO9000
quality control manual... It’s not sloppiness or anything
like that. But it’s just the practical operation of things.’
Interviews with farmers also highlighted the ubiquity
of human error. Interviewees could relate a litany of
human error that occurs in everyday farming practice.
The milk of cows being treated with antibiotics, for
example, is meant to be kept out of the milk sold off
the farm, and these cows are marked to indicate this.
However, farmers cited cases of such markings coming
off or just being missed by the person responsible for
milking. These errors occur despite strong economic
incentives to comply: Companies receiving the milk
impose heavy financial penalties for farmers whose milk
contains antibiotics.
As with potential harms, the assessment of (claimed)
benefits, such as it is, rarely seeks detailed knowledge of
the contexts with which the technology must interact if
the benefits are to be realised. Yet potential adopters’
understanding of their own situation is crucial to evalu-
ating potential benefits. Biopharming is promoted to
(and by) governments and regulators as bringing signifi-
cant economic benefits to those jurisdictions and actors
who engage in it. In New Zealand, biopharming has
been framed as a solution to the problem of competi-
tiveness in an economy dependent on commodity pro-
duction and consequently as a bringer of new options
and benefits to New Zealand farmers.h On this basis,
biopharming research and development have received
generous public funding.
Specialty seed farmers and seed production companies,
however, described a distribution of market power that
militates strongly against seed biopharming returning
major benefits to New Zealand [44,43]. With a similar dis-
tribution of power likely to obtain in the dairy sector,
dairy farmers, who doubted it would be possible to com-
bine biopharm and conventional cows in the same opera-
tion, would be reluctant to leave their existing supply
relationships to venture into biopharming [42]. The practi-
calities of implementing biopharming, both in terms of
measures to prevent contamination and in terms of rela-
tive distribution of market power, suggest that it is in fact
unlikely that New Zealand farmers would benefit in any
significant way from the introduction of biopharming. The
likelihood and distribution of benefits are tightly linked
not only to specificities of context, as argued here, but also
to the processes of co-production discussed above: GMOs
are a business strategy enabled through a particular intel-
lectual property regime, and this drives both the framing
of problems to which GMOs can be offered as a solution
and the distribution (and nature) of benefits.
The implications of the different types of knowledge
related here are diverse. Farmer knowledge of biophysical
processes based on long experience of particular contexts
is clearly relevant to assessing the potential impacts of
biopharming and other agricultural GMO production.
Farmer knowledge of their own economic position, e.g.
their relative power in their commodity chain, is rele-
vant to a more realistic assessment of promoters’ claims
of economic benefit. Both of these types of knowledge
should be routinely integrated into assessment pro-
cesses. Farmer knowledge of farmers’ actual practices
and of the economic and other circumstances that influ-
ence these is also relevant, primarily to assessing the
adequacy of and likely compliance with management
regimes, as is knowledge derived from interviews with
farmers about their and others’ attitudes towards the ris-
kiness of biopharming (or GMOs) and thus towards the
suitability of prescribed management practices. This
suggests that rather than assuming that practitioner atti-
tude and error are manageable through protocols and
monitoring and that the existence of economic benefit
can be read from the presumably rational intention of
the applicant or adopter to deploy the technology, prac-
titioner attitude and error as well as economic context
should be viewed as integral to producing and therefore
assessing, environmental and health risks.i
The case of biopharming also reinforces the more fun-
damental challenge for GMO (and, indeed, technology)
governance regimes posed by the frame analysis. The
business case for biopharming rests on the claims of
cheaper drug production. Biopharming introduces a new
(otherwise non-existent) hazard of pharmaceutical con-
tamination of the food supply. Regulators have thus far
failed to implement two obvious measures that would
offer protection against such contamination - prohibiting
the use of food organisms and requiring confinement to
indoor production systems - presumably at least in part
because they have been persuaded that it would ser-
iously erode the profitability, and thus economic bene-
fits, of biopharming. This decision highlights the
importance of the fundamental question framed out of
risk assessment processes: Does the purpose of the
technology - understood not in terms of claimed,
unproven benefits but in terms of the aims of the sys-
tem that produced it - justify the risk that it is inevita-
bly imposing?
Ecosocial analysis
GMOs affect the agri-food production system and have
an impact not only on the environmental context into
which they are introduced but also in the way people
feel, live and interact with this context. For example, in
many European countries, efforts have been made to
support organic farming, small-sized farms, local pro-
ducts and cooperatives. This kind of territorial market-
ing has created a new ecosocial equilibrium in many
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rural communities, mitigating land abandonment and
helping in the preservation of significant traits of
so-called vanishing traditional landscapes. In such a
context, GMOs and their regime of production and
innovation will inevitably interact not only with the eco-
logical but also the social equilibrium built on the ecolo-
gical one. As a consequence, social analysis needs to be
integrated with ecological studies on long-term environ-
mental and ecosystemic changes affecting target farming
areas. However, at least three main problems have so far
prevented the integration of ecosocial analysis into risk
assessment procedures: the lack of long-term studies,
existing methodological deficiencies and a narrow, de-
contextualised approach to risks and benefits of GM
crops.
The lack of long-term studies maintains a fairly high
uncertainty in the assessment of risks for the environ-
ment and human health, strengthened by the unpredict-
ability of some by-products of genetic manipulation
[50]. For instance, Bt corn has been created through the
insertion of the genes coding for the Cry toxins of Bacil-
lus thuringiensis under specific promoters that were
expected to act in the green parts of the plant, or in the
pollen, but not in the roots [51]. Therefore, the steady
occurrence of the toxin in the roots and exudates of Bt
corn provides a good example of an unpredicted attri-
bute (which also has potential long-term implications
for the microbial fauna in the soil).
All the relevant literature on the environmental risks
and benefits of the large-scale cultivation of GMOs
compares the ‘environmental performances’ of trans-
genic crops vs. the conventional ones, but little attention
is devoted to the long-term consequences of the
observed changes in the frequency and distribution of
commensal species (target and non-target organisms) at
the ecosystem scale. There has not been time enough to
produce sound results on such issues [52]. On the basis
of this performance-based approach, modern agriculture
became responsible of an ever-increasing trophic and
ecological gap between cultivated areas and neighbour-
ing ecosystems. Now, apart from introducing the speci-
fic hazards associated with genetic modifications, GM
commercial crops perpetuate the very economic and
social model of aggressive exploitation, intensive large-
scale cultivations and biodiversity reduction associated
with conventional crops cultivated under modern agri-
culture principles. This is regrettable not only for
aesthetical or scientific reasons linked to biodiversity
conservation but also for the simple, utilitarian reason
that the more we reduce and select the species
co-occurring with the crops, the more we reduce the
probability that there will be early bio-indicators of
unanticipated risks and implications of the introduced
technologies. In the last 50 years, natural early-warning
signals were shown to be useful and effective instru-
ments for the safeguard of human lives: For instance,
the high toxicity and persistence of dichlorodiphenyltri-
chloroethane and polychlorinated biphenyls were identi-
fied in such way [53,54].
Natural macro-phenomena, and their changes and var-
iations, may be considered, to a certain extent, predict-
able, but the more technology is able to transform the
molecular characteristics of natural processes, the more
the final outcome is unpredictable. This unpredictability
proceeds from the existing gap between the pace regu-
lating natural biological evolution, on the one hand, and
the man-made technological evolution, on the other
hand. Current nucleotide sequences are the result of
biological evolution over three billion years. Changes in
gene sequences may alter gene products, which have an
impact on other genes and on other organisms: Each
gene mutation triggers a series of spillover effects until a
new equilibrium is reached in the homeostatic context
of the ecosystem. Molecules are connected to the eco-
systems thanks to the intrinsic ability of living matter to
connect, interact and move towards more and more
complex levels of integration. These processes do not
repeat themselves indefinitely because the retroaction
links responsible for preserving the homeostasis of the
system are not completely self-contained but, rather,
integrated in the evolutionary consistency of the
biosphere.
In this respect, the ecosystem is not a complicated but
a complex system. Complicated systems, though difficult
to analyse, can be completely explored, provided that
enough time and proper tools are available. Yet, com-
plex systems, like biological ones, cannot be exhaustively
analysed because their evolution is not predictable. In
other words, whilst it is certainly possible to insert exo-
genous genes into a chromosome, it is impossible to
predict and calculate the outcomes and the interactions
that will follow over long periods. Traditional engineer-
ing customarily derives its certainty from measures and
deterministic descriptions that allow for predictable
results. Genetic engineering, in contrast, may well
understand and quantify the productive performances of
GMOs or their advantages in terms of a reduced need
for fertilizers, but cannot predict or even foresee the
medium- and long-term risks of introducing species that
are alien to the global homeostatic equilibrium of the
biosphere. Only natural selection processes will reveal
beyond doubt whether these organisms will have been,
from an evolutionary point of view, incorporated with-
out major damages. Yet, this process is very slow, and
its pace is certainly incompatible with market
requirements.
It may be observed that not only in the case of GMOs
but also at each breeding or cellular duplication casual
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mutations can happen, and these mutations are selected
in the environment at individual level. Therefore, mole-
cular effects of genetic manipulations are unpredictable
like those of natural mutations occurring in natural
breeding. Yet, there is a substantial difference that is not
sufficiently considered in the actual case by case envir-
onmental risk assessment proposed by EFSA: The time
needed to achieve a sufficient statistical power to detect
possible effects of GMOs on the environment is sub-
stantially different between conventional and GM crops:
Natural mutations and hybridization have been used to
select the most desirable characters of cultivated plants
since the very beginning of agriculture. So, any current
statement on the environmental risks of conventional
crops is based on very long-term observations, which
cannot be automatically extended to the GMOs per ana-
logy simply because apparently there’s no difference in
the frequency, variation and replication of mutations
obtained through the insertion of homologous and het-
erologous genes. Another very critical statement of the
EFSA procedure is that the duration of experiments to
assess the risks to non-target organisms should be suffi-
cient to reflect the pattern and duration of exposure
that these organisms are likely to experience under field
conditions [55-57]. Is this really feasible?
From a methodological perspective, current risk
assessment methods evaluate GM risks on the basis of
risk/benefit analysis and short-term environmental
impact in comparison to conventional crops. Though
necessary, this type of evaluation, which focuses on a
direct cause-effect approach, falls short when environ-
mental issues have to be addressed, for the homeostasis
of the ecosystem is guaranteed by non-linear transfor-
mations. To date, we have accumulated significant evi-
dence showing that environmental damage cannot be
assessed through cost-benefit analysis, not only because
the long-term impact cannot be easily predicted but also
because the actual genetic modifications cannot be eval-
uated through simple calculations of causes and effects.
Plant pathology, very much like human pathology,
focuses more and more on degenerative alterations,
which often emerge a long time after the exposure to
the pathogenic agent has actually occurred [58]. As a
result, not only is it incorrect to link xenobiotics and
the actual damage in a cause-effect relationship but it is
also misleading to consider that a substance, or a
genetic expression, is non-toxic just because it does not
interfere with a given metabolic process [59].
This situation is leading the European Union (EU)
towards what we may call a ‘biodiversity paradox’. On
the one hand, it endorses and sponsors the development
and implementation of GM commercial crops, which
perpetuate and, allegedly, worsen the impact of large-
scale intensive industrial agriculture on the survival of
the residual populations, plants and microorganisms
existing in the agroecosystem. On the other hand,
recognizing the threats to biodiversity and environmen-
tal preservation, the EU is setting up a strategy aiming
at preserving biodiversity through the creation of pro-
tected ecosystems where residual and rare species are
confined [60,61] This paradox raises two main issues:
First, it tends to confine biodiversity in restricted spaces,
leaving the remaining agroecosystem permeable to GM
crops, and second, the prospective protected ecosystems
are not even big enough to be unaffected by external
influences. This typically applies to Italy, where farm
properties are relatively small and fragmented and the
geomorphology of the territory makes the approach
based on protected ecosystems unfeasible.
The Italian case is especially interesting because it pre-
sents a number of characteristics that call into question
the applicability of risk assessment studies conducted in
other nations. Italy, for instance, possesses a high biolo-
gical diversity, which results from a great variety of cli-
matic and environmental factors in a relatively small
territory, mainly characterised by mountains, by the
influence of the sea and by a prevalent orientation along
the north-south line. It is generally accepted that to
avoid cross-pollination and contamination, it is neces-
sary to place GM crops on big portions of flat land, con-
tained by a belt of similar, conventional, crops. In Italy,
these conditions apply only to about 20% of the terri-
tory. Moreover, in Italy, there is still a significant variety
of wild versions of cultivated crops, which makes the
risk of contamination even higher than elsewhere. This
remarkable territorial diversity is reflected in a note-
worthy normative and administrative fragmentation. In
Italy, there are more than 100 municipalities, grouped
into dozens of provinces and 20 regions, which actually
have different degrees of administrative and legislative
autonomy. As the political answer to this coordination
problem has been to attribute an ever-increasing auton-
omy to the local and regional administrations, this is
shifting the whole responsibility, not only in territorial
planning but also on the application of agricultural poli-
cies, to local authorities. This may well reduce the dis-
tance between citizens, firms and the administration
authorities, but it also generates different views on goals
and priorities pursued by these authorities, increasing
rather than reducing, de facto, the coordination problem
and the lack of an integrated, organic and consistent
agricultural policy.
In such a context, characterised by serious coordina-
tion problems and a lack of an integrated agricultural
strategy, a risk/benefit analysis merely focused on the
performance comparison between GM and conventional
crops may contribute important knowledge about some
relevant features of GM commercial crops but will not
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be sufficient to evaluate the impact of GM crops on the
local ecosystem (previously defined as the result of the
interactions between social and natural elements) and
on the social and economic arrangements that have
been so far built on that specific ecosystem. By the same
token, framing the debate on biotechnologies merely in
terms of scientific and technical comparisons between
GM and conventional crops not only runs the risk of
endorsing a narrow contextualization of the assessment
but it also fails to acknowledge the inherent complexity
of ecological and social assessment strategies. How
appropriate is it to promote or permit the cultivation of
GM crops in a country whose culture and economy is
based on local biodiversity, agricultural tourism, DOP
(Protected Origin Denomination) productions, high-
quality wines and food? In fact, the economic success of
these sectors would rather suggest the opposite strategy:
invest even more in these sectors to renew and
strengthen the international reputation of a country
where ecological biodiversity is no less attractive, and
indeed inextricably interlinked with, historical and cul-
tural diversity.
The point here is not so much that GMOs are not a
promising investment in the Italian social and economic
context. Rather, we suggest that the assessment of the
actual benefits of introducing GM commercial crops in
a given ecosocial system should also take into considera-
tions the specific ecological and socioeconomic peculia-
rities of the areas proposed for cultivation. In other
words, the assurance of health and environmental safety
plus the improved economic features of a GM commer-
cial crop compared to the conventional alternative are
not per se a sufficient motivation to authorize GM culti-
vation unless other ecological and social factors, specific
to the prospective cultivation area, are also positively
evaluated. Assessing GM commercial crops vis-à-vis dif-
ferent ecosocial areas may give rise to different out-
comes because introducing GM crops in areas already
extensively cultivated with conventional varieties in a
massive industrial agriculture exploitation landscape
where large-size farms constitute the dominant socioe-
conomic form of organization may not have the same
ecosocial impact than introducing GM commercial
crops where small-size farming of local varieties in a
mountain-based landscape constitute the backbone of
specific social and cultural institutions and life organiza-
tions. Our point is not that Italy should ban GMOs;
rather, we argue that it is increasingly important to
think in terms of an ecosocial equilibrium, whereby the
ecological homeostatic equilibrium is part and parcel
with the socioeconomic equilibrium reached around
given cultivations, eating habits and farming practices,
which have evolved during decades and are repositories
of traditions, values, meanings and community life
interactions. Whether this should be assessed on a
country-by-country basis or by a common European
agency is subject to an ongoing debate. Either way, what
is of utmost importance is that the relationship between
the ecological and the socioeconomic equilibrium is
duly taken into consideration.
Conclusions
GMO assessment is a complex issue (not a complicated
one), and risk assessment studies, no matter how
sophisticated they are, cannot produce definite and
unquestionable results because it is not merely a matter
of an objective science delivering ‘the facts’. In fact, risk
assessment procedures embody social and political
values and so do the technologies assessed. For a
socially and scientifically more robust assessment, these
values must be made explicit and taken into account
when GM technologies are assessed. In this paper, thus,
we have explored an approach to assessment of GMOs
from a broader perspective, which not only highlighted
the cognitive limits and the political implications of cur-
rent risk assessment approaches but also took into con-
sideration social, political, institutional and ecological
elements.
First, we suggested the politics and ethics of a given
technology be unpacked, by addressing the emergence,
the sociotechnical networks, the power relationships and
the economic interests that are tightly interrelated
in the process of innovation and implementation. In this
step - which addressed the question: what kind of future
society is embedded in this technology? - the technosocial
imaginaries and visions driving and underpinning tech-
nology innovation and implementation of Syngenta have
been de-constructed and scrutinized, not only per se but
also in relation to dominant sociopolitical imaginaries.
Whilst GM producers patent their discoveries and
impose royalties on their products, GMOs are framed as
solutions to world hunger and environmental degrada-
tion. The debate therefore shifts to costs and benefits of
GMOs, whilst the basic question of why GMOs were
developed in the first place remains unanswered and,
indeed, disappears into the background. Visions and
imaginaries sustaining technological innovation do mat-
ter: Scientists’ and companies’ values need to be
unpacked and analysed. In addition, it is time to incor-
porate non-technical expertise: Lay publics, social scien-
tists and farmers have access to relevant societal
knowledge that has to inform risk assessment. Frame
analysis should, therefore, be deployed at the very
upstream level, when a given technology is emerging as
a potential opportunity to be considered for future
investments.
In the second step - which addressed the question: in
what kind of society is this technology going to be
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implemented? - we have shown the necessity of evaluat-
ing a technology in its proposed context of implementa-
tion, as well as the need to access locally based,
experiential knowledge in order to do this. Social and
institutional practices operating at local and national
levels provide important information on how a given
technology is likely to be implemented and to interact
with other social and technical artefacts. Risk assessment
procedures should focus not only on the safety of the
technology but also on the safety of the context as a
recipient of the technology [62] In this respect, our
examples suggest that not only the biophysical and
social elements of context but also the fundamental pur-
pose of the technologies - in the sense of their driving
forces or economic logic of development - as much as
their technical capabilities are relevant to assessing
potential harms and benefits. Context analysis, therefore,
should complement and integrate current risk assess-
ment procedures in order to produce a more compre-
hensive and socially robust knowledge about risks and
potential benefits, which includes all those societal
forms of knowledge currently excluded by risk assess-
ment procedures on the grounds of their non-scientific
nature.
In the third step - which addressed the question: how is
this technology likely to affect the ecosocial equilibrium of
the area in which it is going to be introduced? - ecosocial
analysis was suggested. Social meanings, actions and rela-
tionships arise and are enacted around specific local
environments and around the local understanding and
framing of it. Changing these environments will inevita-
bly change the sociorelational domains constructed
around them. Therefore, ecosocial studies should study
the impact of GMOs not only on the biophysical ecosys-
tem but also on the social community that is part and
parcel of that ecosystem. Ecosocial analysis, therefore,
should guide policy makers in the third and final step, in
which the suitability of given ecological areas for the
introduction of GM crops is evaluated.
In sum, we argue that frame analysis, context analysis
and ecosocial analysis should be performed along with
the trajectory of the technology at stake and accompany
the traditional risk assessment procedures to ensure
social compatibility, political accountability and ecologi-
cal sustainability. These three steps may help consoli-
date a more robust social assessment, which we define
as an in-context trajectory evaluation.
Endnotes
aFor more information, please refer to the EFSA Confer-
ence on ‘GMO risk assessment for Human and Animal
Health and the Environment’, 14-15 September 2009,
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753
812_1211902768091.htm.
bThe same logic is applied to world hunger (farmland
is limited: how do we feed a growing population?) and to
the relationship between poverty and education (our
seeds enable children to spend more time in the
classroom).
cSee the key US Supreme Court decisions, e.g. Chakra-
barty vs. Diamond case (1980) and the US legislation,
the Bayh Dole Act (1980).
d’Socially robust knowledge has three, interrelated
aspects: it is tested for validity outside as well as inside
the laboratory; it is most likely to be achieved by invol-
ving an extended group of experts; it results from hav-
ing been repeatedly tested, expanded and modified’
[[23], p.155].
eWe note that the recent (July 2010) proposal of the
European Commission that member states should have
responsibility for decisions on cultivation of GMOs in
their territories refers to the need to take into account
regional and local factors, both agronomic and natural,
when determining measures for coexistence or whether
GMO-free areas should be created. Specific mention is
made of, among other considerations, different ‘climatic
conditions (that influence the activity of pollinators and
the transport of airborne pollen)’ [62].
fWe note that containment protocols established in
various jurisdictions, including those proposed for bio-
pharming, would not protect against contamination in
the circumstances described here [47-49].
gThat is, biopharm crops would compete economically
with each other and with biopharm animals as ‘produc-
tion platforms’ or ‘bioreactors’ producing therapeutic
proteins, and both would compete with laboratory (vat)
production. At least to date, biopharming is an alterna-
tive method for producing drugs that can already be
produced in other systems, rather than a source of new
drugs.
hIn other venues, particularly when in the midst of risk
assessment processes with public input, biopharming is
promoted as the path to curing disease, even though to
date biopharm R&D has focused on the production of
generic versions of existing biopharmaceuticals.
iIt should be noted that EFSA not only recognises the
potential usefulness of farmer knowledge in relation to
post-release monitoring of GM plants but also demon-
strates a failure to recognise the influence of practitioner
attitude and economic context when it suggests that it is
the farmers already growing the GMO who should be
drawn upon for post-release monitoring of environmen-
tally harmful effects of the GMO [15].
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